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NOTE
IIRIRA, SECTION 601(a): AN AMBIGUOUS,
PROBLEMATIC, YET FOUNDATIONAL PROVISION FOR
IMMIGRATION LAW—CAN IT BE FIXED?
Caleb A. Sweazey†
ABSTRACT
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (the “IIRIRA”) provides a standard that defines unlawful human
presence in the United States and establishes the consequences faced for
such unlawful presence. Title VI, Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA (“Section
601(a)”) grants asylum to people who have undergone a forced abortion or
sterilization, or been threatened with the procedure, in their native country.
Section 601(a) is problematic because it does not clearly identify how far,
or even whether, the granting of asylum extends to relatives of the victim of
a forced abortion or forced sterilization. Furthermore, Section 601(a) does
not address the union of marriage; therefore, the section does not provide a
definition or requirements for a victim’s partner to be considered a husband
or spouse. Additionally, the lack of clarity in Section 601(a)(2) concerning
the required Attorney General’s report for such grants of asylum is
problematic. These deficiencies have caused immigration officials to apply
Section 601(a) inconsistently and a split among the federal appellate
circuits. This division and inconsistency undercuts the purpose of United
States immigration, which is to provide specific standards to all judicial
circuits and officials within the United States in order to bring about the
consistent and equitable application of immigration law.
This Note’s proposed solution to this division within jurisprudence is to
adopt an amendment to Section 601(a). The amendment would clarify
which relatives of a victim should be granted asylum and would
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particularize the Attorney General’s required report even further. An
amendment to Section 601(a) is the best solution to the problem, because
even though the IIRIRA has not achieved a solution to all immigration
problems, the Act has established foundational tenets on which to build,
particularly in the area of asylum for victims of forced abortions and forced
sterilizations. Asylum under the amendment to Section 601(a) would extend
only to the legal husband and children of the victim of a forced abortion or
forced sterilization. This requirement and specification concerning relatives
would prevent falsification and fraud in the application process. Such an
amendment also would require that the Attorney General’s report contain
documented evidence that each approved applicant underwent a forced
abortion or forced sterilization that was coercive, and it would establish
criteria for required approval of asylum applications. These changes would
clarify the confusion within jurisprudence concerning the application of
Section 601(a) and would prevent ad hoc decision making by both the
Attorney General and other officials in the determination and approval
process concerning asylum applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (the
“IIRIRA” or “Act”) provided a critical component of immigration reform
when it was signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1996.1 The IIRIRA
provides a standard that defines unlawful human presence in the United
States; the Act also establishes the consequences faced by a person that is
unlawfully present in the United States.2 However, the IIRIRA contains an
unclear, and thus problematic, provision in Title VI, Section 601(a) of the
Act (“Section 601(a)”).3 Section 601(a) grants asylum to people who have
undergone a forced abortion or sterilization, or have been threatened with
either procedure, in their native country.4
There are two major problems with Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA as it is
written. First, Section 601(a) does not clearly identify how far, or even
whether, the granting of asylum extends to relatives of the victim of a

1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 [hereinafter IIRIRA] (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
2. Id.
3. IIRIRA § 601(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
4. Id.
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forced abortion or forced sterilization (“victim”).5 Debate exists as to how
closely related one must be to the victim in order to gain asylum under
Section 601(a). This debate stems from the fact that Section 601(a) does not
address the union of marriage.6 The lack of any definition or requirements
for a victim’s partner to qualify as a husband or spouse opens up the
possibility that any partner of a victim could gain asylum due to the
victim’s experiences. This ambiguity extends to the debate as to which
family members of a victim may gain asylum. Due to this lack of a
standard, there has been an inconsistent application of Section 601(a) by
immigration officials, as well as a circuit split among appellate courts.7 It is
necessary to amend Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA to provide asylum to the
immediate family members of a victim under the laws of the victim’s home
country.8 These immediate family members shall only include the legal
husband and the children of a victim, because non-spousal partners are
often not readily and unmistakably identifiable under the laws of the
victim’s home country.9
The second problem is the ineffectiveness concerning the requirement
for a report from the Attorney General in Section 601(a)(2).10 For example,
one potential problem created by Section 601(a)11 is the possibility that a
foreign woman could undergo a voluntary abortion or sterilization and later
claim that the procedure was coercive in the hope of gaining legal residence
in the United States. Such a problem exists because Section 601(a)(2) only
requires the Attorney General report to describe how many aliens have been
admitted, to identify the aliens’ country of origin, and to estimate the
numbers and origins of aliens that probably will gain asylum in the next
two fiscal years.12 These minimal reporting requirements are not specific
enough to ensure the investigation and prevention of the fraudulent scenario
previously described. Each of these deficiencies creates confusion in the
application of this important section of the IIRIRA, and thus undercuts the

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
See infra text accompanying note 45.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note

9.
183.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note

183.

See infra text accompanying note 45.
IIRIRA § 601(a).
See infra text accompanying note 45.
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purpose of the entire Act.13 Therefore, the required Attorney General’s
report must contain documented evidence that the abortion or sterilization
was coercive.14
In addition to addressing the two ambiguities mentioned above, the
amendment should require that a candidate for asylum provide evidence
that she is not exempt from the forced family planning policies of her native
country in any way.15 The goal behind the IIRIRA, and thus United States
immigration policy, is and ought to be to provide specific standards that
require the government, courts, and officials to grant asylum to certain
oppressed individuals without unnecessarily providing the opportunity to
foreign individuals to take advantage of the system. However, the
ambiguities in the wording of the IIRIRA have undercut that goal, as seen
in the confusion and disagreement in judicial application of the statute.
This Note focuses on the current version of Section 601(a), the
problematic effects that the section has had on the legal system, and
proposes a solution to the problems of Section 601(a). The ambiguities in
Section 601(a) have caused a split in authority among the circuits
concerning whether asylum under the Section only extends to the husband
of a victim who has suffered a forced abortion or forced sterilization, or
rather not only to a husband but also to an unmarried partner of such a
victim.16 Although the majority of circuits hold that asylum only extends to
the husbands of victims, a growing minority of circuits have held that
asylum also extends to the partners of victims.17 Additionally, some circuits
have expressed doubt as to whether asylum should automatically extend to
any relative of a victim at all.18 Therefore, this Note’s proposed solution to
the division within IIRIRA jurisprudence is to adopt an amendment to
Section 601(a) in order to clarify which relatives of a victim should be
granted asylum and to particularize the requirements of the Attorney
General’s report even further.19 An amendment to Section 601(a) is the best
solution to the problem because, even though the IIRIRA has not achieved
a solution to all immigration problems, it has established foundational
13.
14.
183.
15.
183.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note
See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.B.2.a.
See infra Part III.B.2.b.
See infra Part IV.
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tenets upon which to build, particularly in the area of asylum for victims of
forced abortions and forced sterilizations.20 The proposed amendment to
Section 601(a) would have three provisions: (1) it would only extend
asylum to the legal husband and children of the victim of a forced abortion
or forced sterilization; (2) it would require that the Attorney General’s
report contain documented evidence that each approved applicant
underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization; and (3) it would
establish criteria for required approval of asylum applications.
II. BACKGROUND

A person who looks to the United States for asylum—for a safe
place to live—must overcome significant barriers before such
protection will be granted.21 The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (the “INA”) is a foundational statute concerning asylum law,
and was enacted prior to the IIRIRA.22 The INA requires that an
asylum applicant establish a well-founded fear of persecution.23 In
order for a fear of persecution to be well-founded, an applicant must
demonstrate that he or she was persecuted on account of “race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”24 This requirement in the INA laid the foundation
and provided a major reference point for the provisions in the
IIRIRA, specifically in Section 601. Despite its lengthy statutory
elements and requirements, the INA contained ambiguous language
that gave substantial discretion to courts in determinations
concerning asylum applications.25 Despite the identification of such
terms as “persecution,” “well-founded fears,” and the five grounds
that are protected from such persecution, the standards set forth in the
INA lacked sufficient clarity. As a result, courts had to determine
exactly what persecution means, identify the fears that are wellfounded, and recognize actions that qualify as persecution when
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 [hereinafter INA] (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
25. Andy Rottman, Comment, The Rocky Path from Section 601 of the IIRIRA to IssueSpecific Asylum Legislation Protecting the Parents of FGM-Vulnerable Children, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. 533, 542 (2009).
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those actions were based on one of the five protected grounds.26
Because this ambiguity extends from the earlier INA to the latter
IIRIRA, legislative clarity in this area is necessary to prevent judicial
confusion, judicial standard-setting, and judicial activism. The next
three sections will set out these ambiguities that started in the INA
and continued through the enactment of the IIRIRA, to highlight the
provisions ripe for legislation.
A. IIRIRA Requirement #1: Persecution
According to the INA, any application for asylum must involve the
important element of persecution.27 Although the courts adhere to various
definitions of persecution, the Ninth Circuit adequately defined persecution
as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race,
28
religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.” To be
considered, any asylum applicant must therefore show that the alleged
harm that he or she faces is persecution.29 Courts may artfully define
persecution, but immigration officials must remember that such definitions
are judicial constructions. Thus, courts are not limited to a statutory
definition of persecution, but rather are free to define persecution as they
see fit. This lack of a legislative standard allows courts and government
officials to approve and deny asylum applications essentially at will.
B. IIRIRA Requirement #2: Well Founded Fear of the Alleged Persecution
In addition, even if the applicant meets this persecution standard, the
applicant must also show a well-founded fear of the alleged persecution.30
This well-founded fear requirement contains subjective and objective
components.31 The subjective component requires the asylum applicant
32
actually experience a fear of persecution and such fear must be genuine.
The objective component of the well-founded fear element requires that the

26. Id.
27. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
28. Ghaly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995);
see also Rottman, supra note 25, at 542.
29. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i).
30. Id.; see also Rottman, supra note 25, at 542.
31. Rodriguez-Rivera v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998,
1001 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 1002.
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33
applicant’s fears of persecution be reasonable. This objective component
requires the applicant to show that there is a “‘clear probability’ . . . of
persecution,” meaning that it is more likely than not that the applicant’s life
or freedom is threatened.34 The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”)
has held that to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must
prove that a “persecutor seeks to overcome [a belief] by means of
punishment of some sort, [that] the persecutor is already aware, or could
easily become aware” that the applicant holds that belief, and that the
persecutor wants to punish holders of the belief and is capable of punishing
holders of the belief.35 Like the definition of persecution, these
requirements for a well-founded fear of persecution are problematic
because they are not legislatively created and thus not generally applicable
to all circuits.

C. IIRIRA Requirement #3: Proper Reason for the Persecution Suffered
Finally, the applicant bears the burden of proving that the persecution
suffered, or the well-founded fear of persecution, was “on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”36 Generally, “this means that there must be some nexus between
37
the persecution and the protected category.” On its face, this requirement
does not provide asylum to victims of forced abortion or forced
sterilization. Rather, this element of the asylum application requires a court
to engage in a difficult analysis and determination of “the exact motive or
38
motives for which harm has been inflicted.” In addition to the court, the
Attorney General may grant asylum at his or her discretion.39 Further, even
if the applicant meets all of the elements, the adjudicator may still find
reason to deny the application for asylum.40 Although this does not usually
occur, the power placed in the hands of adjudicators due to the lack of
legislative direction and standards, illuminates the precarious position that

33. Id. at 1002.
34. Cardoza-Fonseca v. U.S. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985).
35. In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987).
36. INA § 101(a)(42) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
37. See Rottman, supra note 25, at 543.
38. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996).
39. In re A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 780 (A.G. 2005) (decided by Attorney General
Ashcroft).
40. Id. at 780.
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41
asylum applicants occupy. As stated previously, these categories are
ambiguous and flexible, and they give courts and the Attorney General too
much freedom and too little concrete direction in granting asylum.42 Also,
no provision exists to protect the victims of forced abortions or forced
sterilizations, and therefore courts that analyze such provisions are not
required to provide such protection.

D. The IIRIRA Fills In the Gaps of the INA
The IIRIRA43 was a response to both controversial case law and calls for
statutory clarity concerning the legal requirements for foreigners seeking
asylum in the United States. The Act sought to clarify the ambiguities and
confusion in asylum law by restricting the overall availability of asylum
and by expanding the protected category of political opinion, as seen in
Section 601(a).44 According to Section 601(a) of the Act:
(1) . . . For purposes of determinations under this Act, a
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure
or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to
a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person
who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
(2) Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year,
the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate describing the number and
countries of origin of aliens granted refugee status or asylum
under determinations pursuant to the amendment made by
paragraph (1). Each such report shall also contain projections
regarding the number and countries of origin of aliens that are

41.
42.
43.
44.

See Rottman, supra note 25, at 543.
Id. at 542-43.
IIRIRA § 601(a).
Id.; see also Rottman, supra note 25, at 547-48.
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likely to be granted refugee status or asylum for the subsequent 2
fiscal years.45
Section 601(a) grants asylum to people who have undergone a forced
abortion or sterilization, have been persecuted for refusing such a
procedure, or have been threatened with the procedure in their native
country.46 To gain asylum for threats or persecution, a victim-applicant
must show a well-founded fear of persecution.47 Like the INA, Section
601(a) of the IIRIRA contains the same ambiguous standards of “wellfounded fear” and “persecution,” as well as the protected ground of political
opinion.48 Section 601(a) also gives a great amount of discretion to the
Attorney General by failing to establish a detailed list of requirements for
the Attorney General’s report.49 This failure allows the Attorney General to
exercise personal discretion in granting or refusing asylum. Clearly, Section
601(a) of the IIRIRA has many of the same problems and ambiguities of
the INA.50
Despite Congress’ attempt to clarify the controversial area of asylum by
passing the Act, IIRIRA Section 601(a) contains many ambiguities and has
caused much judicial confusion.51 The ambiguities in Section 601(a)
include a lack of direction as to which relatives of the victim qualify for
asylum and what difficulties faced by an applicant qualify as persecution.52
The circuits have applied the IIRIRA in varying ways, which reflects the
lack of clarity contained in the statute. Some circuits have held that the
IIRIRA gives asylum to the spouses of the victims;53 other circuits have
refused to follow this interpretation of the IIRIRA’s application to the
relatives of victims. Although many of the following cases and subsequent
statutes attempted to clarify the ambiguities, the confusion and lack of
predictability in the area of asylum reflects the need for amendments to the
IIRIRA that will help courts to apply the law to difficult and emotion-filled
situations. The varying application of the IIRIRA by the circuits, the lack of
standards for the Attorney General’s report and powers, and Section
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

IIRIRA § 601(a) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Rottman, supra note 25, at 544.
IIRIRA § 601(a); see infra Part III.
Rottman, supra note 25, at 548-49.
Id. at 552-53.
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601(a)’s lack of a clear definition of a well-founded fear of persecution
create problems that must be addressed, and this Note attempts to do it by
proposing an amendment.
III. PROBLEM: THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IIRIRA’S
SHORTCOMINGS
The ambiguity of the definitions contained in Section 601(a) of the
IIRIRA has caused many problems in the legal and social sphere. A circuit
split currently exists concerning whether amnesty should be extended to
both the husbands of victims and the boyfriends of victims, or only to the
husbands of victims, under Section 601(a). Additionally, the lack of
standards for the Attorney General’s report and decision-making powers
threatens to give the Attorney General an extreme amount of discretion to
decide whether applicants are awarded asylum. Finally, Section 601(a)
lacks both a clear definition of and standards concerning what well-founded
fear of persecution means. The current version of Section 601(a) of the
IIRIRA is undercutting the Act’s goal to clarify asylum law.
A. The Controversy of In Re Chang That Preceded the IIRIRA
In re Chang is a controversial case that preceded the IIRIRA and
illuminated the need for statutory direction in the area of asylum law.54 In
In re Chang, the asylum applicant, a husband and father of two children,
feared the effect of the forced family planning policy in China on his wife
and himself.55 According to the applicant, government officials told him
and his wife to be sterilized after the birth of their second child.56 The BIA
heard this case and denied asylum to the Chinese applicant who fled his
home country’s coercive family planning system.57 The BIA reasoned that
the asylum applicant had not established a sufficiently well-founded fear of
persecution.58 The BIA’s ruling represented a judicial and administrative
refusal to accept husbands fleeing China’s one-child policy unless the
husband personally had experienced persecution.59 Section 601(a) of the
IIRIRA attempted to overrule this case by providing that “a person who has
a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a[n]
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989).
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 39, 47.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 42.
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[abortive or sterilization] procedure or subject to persecution for such
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear
of persecution on account of political opinion.”60 Although there was no
explicit language establishing the eligibility for asylum of the husbands of
victims, subsequent case law concerning this issue established that Section
601(a) applied to the husbands of victims.61
Despite this provision in the IIRIRA, the statute did not identify how far,
or even whether, the granting of asylum automatically extends to relatives
of the victim who has undergone a forced abortion or sterilization, or been
threatened with the procedure, in his or her native country. The statute also
did not identify whether the granting of asylum extends to the unmarried
partners of victims. Subsequent case law attempted to provide answers to
these ambiguities. Although Section 601(a) attempted to nullify In re
Chang’s denial of asylum to the husbands of victims, Section 601(a) was
not clear enough to stand on its own as applicable to the husbands of
victims and needed case law to determine its applicability.
B. The Effects of In re C-Y-Z-: Asylum to Husbands, but Not to Boyfriends
In In re C-Y-Z-, which was decided after the IIRIRA became law, the
Board of Immigration Appeals held that the grant of asylum provided by
62
Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA broadly extended to the spouse of a victim.
In this case, the asylum applicant and his spouse had three children before
63
Chinese government officials forcibly sterilized the wife. American
immigration officials denied the husband’s application for asylum, and the
husband subsequently appealed this decision to the BIA.64 The BIA held
that the spouses of victims of forcible sterilization or abortion qualified for
asylum under IIRIRA Section 601(a) because the husband had shown that
he underwent past persecution due to the persecution suffered by his wife.65
The Board also held that the only way that immigration officials can rebut a
husband’s showing of past persecution is to show that the conditions or
forced family planning programs in the applicant’s native country changed
to such an extent that the applicant would not be in danger if he returned to

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

IIRIRA § 601(a) (emphasis added).
In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 919-20 (B.I.A. 1997).
Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 915-16.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 918-19.
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66
his native country. This holding meant that the spouse could stand in the
shoes of the victim in an asylum application.67
Many criticized the Board’s decision for a supposed lack of reasoning,
while others praised the decision as a case ensuring equal protection of the
rights of men and women. Although this decision gave asylum to spouses
of victims, the holding did not guarantee this right to the spouses of victims
in the way that a specific amendment to Section 601(a) would. Seven
circuits have deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the IIRIRA in In re CY-Z- in various subsequent decisions.68 In re C-Y-Z- established that asylum
applied to the husbands of victims of abortions or sterilizations under
Section 601(a), apparently solving the problem of the ambiguity of the
statute.

1. Cases That Have Followed or Deferred to the Holding of In re
C-Y-ZIn re C-Y-Z- represents one side of the circuit split, and at least three
circuits have directly followed its reasoning. Chen v. Ashcroft was an
important case that effectively followed In re C-Y-Z- and used similar
69
reasoning to those circuits that have followed or deferred to In re C-Y-Z-.
In Chen v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit refused to grant asylum under Section
601(a) to the partner of a victim because the partner was not the spouse of
the victim under Chinese law.70 The court did not rule directly on In re CY-Z- because it reasoned that the partners’ unmarried status caused the
fiance to fall outside the scope of In re C-Y-Z-.71 The court also reasoned
that a partner must be a legal spouse of the victim because the requirement
of “objective documentary evidence”72 prevents falsification and fraud,
unnecessary intrusion into the lives of the applicants, and that such a
requirement did not subvert congressional intent.73 In Chen v. Ashcroft, the
66. Id. at 919.
67. Id. at 915.
68. Heidi Murphy, Sending the Men over First: Amending Section 601(A) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act to Allow Asylum for Spouses and
Partners, 33 VT. L. REV. 143, 155 (2008).
69. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
70. Id. at 233-35.
71. Id. at 227.
72. Id. at 228.
73. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). The Supreme Court has stated that marital
status is a sufficiently rational requirement, even when the requirement is over- or underinclusive. Id.
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Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. that all courts are required to
give significant deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes when
Congress has given administrative authority to that agency concerning the
74
statute and the statutory language is ambiguous. According to this
principle, courts are to give deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the
IIRIRA because the BIA has administrative authority and the statutory
language is ambiguous.75
Another case that closely followed the holding and reasoning of In re CY-Z- is Lin-Jian v. Gonzales.76 In Lin-Jian, the Fourth Circuit granted
review for an applicant named Lin whose wife had undergone a forced
abortion.77 Lin claimed that his wife had undergone a forced abortion when
she became pregnant after giving birth to a second child.78 The court held
that an applicant may gain refugee status when the applicant’s spouse
underwent a forced abortion, a forced sterilization, threats of either a forced
abortion or sterilization, or had “a well-founded fear of being subjected to
[a forced abortion or sterilization, or persecuted for resistance to] a coercive
population control program.”79 The Fourth Circuit held that Lin was
eligible for asylum if he could produce evidence that his wife underwent a
forced abortion.80 The Fourth Circuit represents another appellate circuit
that followed In re C-Y-Z-’s holding that Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA
broadly extends asylum to the spouse of the victim.81
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit extended asylum to a male applicant in
82
Huang v. Ashcroft in accordance with the holding in In re C-Y-Z-. In
Huang, Chinese government officials forced the applicant’s wife to undergo
not only an abortion but also sterilization when the couple became pregnant
after having their first child.83 The court stated that either of these events

74. Chen, 381 F.3d at 232; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
75. Chen, 381 F.3d at 232.
76. See Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 193.
78. Id. at 185-86.
79. Id. at 188 (quoting Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 1999)).
80. Id. (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997)).
81. Id.; see In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 919-20.
82. Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re C-Y-Z-,
21 I. & N. Dec. at 915).
83. Id. at 697.
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84
established past persecution of the applicant’s wife. The court recognized
that a husband “stand[s] in his wife’s shoes” in an application for asylum.85
Like the Third and Fourth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit followed the reasoning
of In re C-Y-Z- and extended eligibility for refugee status and asylum to
spouses of victims of forced abortions and forced sterilizations.86
These three cases, Chen v. Ashcroft, Lin-Jian, and Huang, explicitly
followed the reasoning behind In re C-Y-Z-, even though Chen v. Ashcroft
did not directly rule on In re C-Y-Z-.87 In both Chen v. Ashcroft and LinJian, the court emphasized the importance and requirement that the asylum
88
applicant produce documentation of legal marriage to the victim.
Similarly, the court in Huang recognized that a legal husband gains the
legal status of his wife concerning the result of an asylum application in the
89
United States. Each court focused on the victim’s spousal relationship to
the applicant in the review of both applications.90
Even without directly commenting on the accuracy of In re C-Y-Z-,
courts have also deferred to it in cases concerning asylum applications. This
deference essentially achieves the same effect as explicitly following In re
C-Y-Z-. However, the situation occurs when an appellate court does not
comment on the validity of In re C-Y-Z-’s reasoning, but rather defers to the
BIA’s interpretation of the seminal case in that particular circumstance. For
example, in Zhang v. Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s denial
of asylum to the boyfriend of the victim of a forced abortion in deference to
In re C-Y-Z- because the boyfriend was not the victim’s husband.91 This
court deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the IIRIRA in In re C-Y-Zbecause the court merely identified and deferred to In re C-Y-Z- as
controlling precedent.92 The court in Zhang also adopted the Third Circuit’s
93
analysis in Chen v. Ashcroft. The Fifth Circuit additionally noted that the
impregnation of a girlfriend did not represent sufficient resistance to the

84. Id. at 700.
85. Id. at 698 (quoting In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997)).
86. Id. at 700.
87. Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d
221, 229-31 (3d Cir. 2004); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 915).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 72 and 80.
89. See supra text accompanying note 85.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72, 80, and 84-85.
91. Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531-32 (5th Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at 532.
93. Id.
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94
forced family planning system of an applicant’s country. As with the
previous circuits, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant asylum to the partner of
a victim of abortion or sterilization without proof of a legal marriage under
Chinese law.95
In another deferential case, Ge v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit held that an
applicant “is automatically eligible for asylum if he can show that his wife
96
was forced to undergo an abortion under China’s one-child policy.” In
this case, a Chinese man applied for asylum on the claim that Chinese
government authorities had forced his wife to undergo abortions.97 The
Immigration Board rejected the application, and the applicant appealed to
the Ninth Circuit.98 The Ninth Circuit overturned the Immigration Board’s
99
rejection in this case. Although the Ninth Circuit directly referred to In re
C-Y-Z- as the basis for its decision, the court remanded the case, instead of
ruling according to In re C-Y-Z-, and granted the BIA discretion on whether
to grant asylum.100 The Ninth Circuit accepted the applicant’s testimony as
true; thus, the applicant should have been granted asylum.101 In this case,
the Ninth Circuit apparently agreed with the other circuits that followed the
literal holding of In re C-Y-Z-, but while the other circuits expressly treated
the seminal case as good law, the Ninth Circuit instead used deferential
language. Again, the effect of a deferential ruling concerning In re C-Y-Zis the same as implicitly or explicitly following the case, as was the case
with Chen v. Ashcroft, Lin-Jiang, and Huang,102 except deference indicates
recognition of a case as precedential, and not necessarily a complete
agreement with the case. The Ninth Circuit’s refusal to apply In re C-Y-Zdirectly via an immediate reversal of the BIA’s denial of asylum
exemplifies the line of cases that defer to In re C-Y-Z- without explicit
comment on the case’s validity.
The Ninth Circuit also applied the same deferential rationale the
following year in Zheng v. Ashcroft. In Zheng, the court held that a married

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Ge v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. Id. at 1122.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1127.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d
221-22, 227 (3d Cir. 2004); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 915).
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asylum applicant had undergone past persecution because his wife had been
103
forced to undergo an abortion. According to the court, a husband also
establishes a rebuttable presumption of future persecution by showing that
104
his native country’s policies forced his wife to undergo an abortion. This
court focused on the importance of marriage in deciding whether a husband
can establish past persecution based on his wife’s forced abortion.105
However, the court allowed the husband to establish past persecution, even
though the couple had not been legally married under Chinese law.106 The
court’s decision to extend recognition of past persecution to the husband of
107
a victim indicated only partial deference to In re C-Y-Z-. However, the
court’s recognition of past persecution and grant of a rebuttable
presumption of future persecution to a partner that technically was not
married under Chinese law indicates the need for an amendment to the
IIRIRA that will clarify which partners of victims may gain asylum in the
United States. The court’s referral to In re C-Y-Z- indicated deference, but it
represented an incomplete following of the case as valid precedent; thus,
the court refused to comment on the validity of In re C-Y-Z- as precedent
and merely deferred to the seminal case.
In another deferential case, Chen v. Gonzalez, the Seventh Circuit
approved the BIA’s decision to deny asylum to a non-spousal applicant for
108
asylum. In Chen v. Gonzales, the court reviewed a case where the BIA
denied asylum to the boyfriend of a victim of a forced abortion, even
though the boyfriend attempted to marry his girlfriend and was denied by
109
Chinese officials based on marriage age limit laws. The court favorably
recognized the number of circuits that deferred to the BIA’s decision in In
re C-Y-Z-.110 After considering the boyfriend’s appeal, the Seventh Circuit
ultimately denied the appeal, agreeing with previous rulings that gave broad
deference to the BIA under the ruling of Chevron.111 This broad deference
given to the BIA demonstrated that the Seventh Circuit joined the Third,

103. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005).
104. Id. at 1148-49.
105. Id, at 1148.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1148-49.
108. Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App’x 528, 528 (7th Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 529-30.
110. Id. at 530.
111. Id. at 531; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984); see also supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ agreements with the holding of In re C-YZ-.
In contrast to the deferential line of cases lacking an opinion on In re CY-Z-’s reasoning and validity as precedent, the Eighth Circuit explicitly
recognized In re C-Y-Z- as good law in Cao v. Gonzales, and analyzed a
112
male’s asylum application claim under that standard. The male applicant
had a registered marriage license at the time of his application and claimed
his wife underwent a forced abortion.113 However, the applicant claimed
that he impregnated his wife five months before they obtained a legal
114
The
marriage certificate, but after a customary marriage ceremony.
Eighth Circuit denied the application for asylum because of inconsistencies
in the applicant’s testimony.115 The applicant claimed he and his wife
received their official marriage registration when she was five months
pregnant, but she said they received it at a later time; the court did not find
116
Although the court denied the husband’s
these claims convincing.
application for asylum due to inconsistent tesitimony, the Eighth Circuit
recognized In re C-Y-Z- as good law, which provided asylum to the
husbands of victims of forced abortions and forced sterilizations in the
117
absence of inconsistencies in testimony. Because IIRIRA Section 601(a)
does not explicitly answer the question of whether a man whose wife has
undergone a forced abortion or sterilization should be given asylum
automatically, such a situation is left to the courts to decipher. Thus, an
amendment to IIRIRA Section 601(a) would aid courts in applying the law
to emotional situations such as this case. Although this case highlights the
need for an amendment, it also identifies that the Eighth Circuit joins the
ranks of the circuits that view In re C-Y-Z- as good law.
Unlike Chen v. Ashcroft,118 Lin-Jian v. Gonzales,119 and Huang v.
Ashcroft,120 the cases of Zhang v. Ashcroft,121 Ge v. Ashcroft,122 Zheng v.
112. Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006).
113. Id. at 659.
114. Id. at 658-59.
115. Id. at 660.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 660-61.
118. 381 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004); see supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
119. 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); see supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
120. 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec.
915); see supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
121. 395 F.3d 531, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2004).
122. 367 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004).
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123
124
125
have deferred to
Ashcroft, Chen v. Gonzalez, and Cao v. Gonzalez
In re C-Y-Z- by holding that a male asylum’s application success is directly
correlated to whether he is the legal husband of the victim of forced
abortion or forced sterilization. As previously argued, mere deference to a
case has the same effect as implicitly or explicitly following a case because
the case’s holding is essentially unchanged. However, mere deference to a
case may indicate that a court only acquiesces to a case’s holding because
the court considers the case to be binding precedent.
Despite the difference between implicitly or explicitly following a case’s
holding and rationale, and merely deferring to a case’s holding via
application of the law in ways avoiding comment on In re C-Y-Z-’s
reasoning and validity as precedent, each of these cases show that a
majority of appellate courts have recently cited the holding in In re C-Y-Z
as good law.126 Therefore, these circuit courts collectively represent the
side of the split that states that asylum extends only to the spouses of
victims under Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA.127

2. Cases That Have Indirectly or Directly Opposed In re C-Y-ZIndirect and direct opposition to the holding in In re C-Y-Z- exists, and is
growing. Some circuits have opposed In re C-Y-Z- indirectly by holding
that asylum under Section 601(a) extends to both the husbands and the
128
boyfriends of victims of forced abortion and forced sterilization. Such
holdings have the effect of broadening the application of In re C-Y-Z-.
Other circuits have directly opposed In re C-Y-Z- by holding that asylum
under Section 601(a) does not automatically extend to either the husbands
or boyfriends of victims of forced abortion and forced sterilization.129
These views represent a growing minority of circuits and illuminate the
need for clarification to IIRIRA Section 601(a).
a. Indirect Opposition: The Broadening of In re C-Y-ZApplication
In Ma v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum under Section 601(a)
of the IIRIRA to the partner of a victim, even though the partner was not
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

397 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005).
152 F. App’x 528, 528 (7th Cir. 2005).
442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006).
See supra Part III.B.1.
In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 919-20 (B.I.A. 1997).
See infra Part III.B.2.a.
See infra Part III.B.2.b.
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130
the spouse of the victim under Chinese law. Ma’s opposition to In re CY-Z- only one year prior to Zheng’s deference to In re C-Y-Z- demonstrates
a split within one appellate circuit.131 The court reasoned that the partner
was not the spouse of the victim due to a Chinese law, which established
the age of marriage in order to enhance coercive family planning policies
132
and reduce the reproductive time period for Chinese couples. In Ma, the
Ninth Circuit held that the court in In re C-Y-Z- and Congress intended to
provide asylum to “‘couples’ persecuted on account of an ‘unauthorized’
pregnancy and to keep families together.”133 The court in Ma extended
asylum to partners who did not have a legal marriage certificate from
Chinese authorities.134 Therefore, this ruling effectively diverged from how
the majority of circuits apply In re C-Y-Z-. The court in In re C-Y-Z- did
not specifically require a couple to be legally married under Chinese law in
order for the husband to gain asylum. However, the court required the
135
The holding in Ma diverges
applicant to be the spouse of the victim.
from the plain reading of In re C-Y-Z- and the majority of circuits in that it
extends asylum to the partners of victims, even when the partner does not
have a valid legal document of marriage under Chinese law. Ma’s holding
supports the need for an amendment to section 601(a) of the IIRIRA,
which will require the objective documentary evidence requirement
identified in Chen v. Ashcroft. Such an amendment will prevent falsification
136
and fraud in the application process for asylum.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit refused to consider In re C-Y-Z- in two
137
separate opinions. In Zhang v. Gonzales, the court held that participants
in traditional marriage ceremonies without legal documentation will qualify
for the automatic grant of asylum to spouses of victims if one of the
138
participants undergoes a forced abortion or forced sterilization. In Zhu v.
Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its application of the standard in

130. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 661 (9th Cir. 2004).
131. Ma, 361 F.3d at 554, 561; see Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir.
2005).
132. Ma, 361 F.3d at 560-61.
133. Id. at 559 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 174 (1996)); see In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997).
134. Ma, 361 F.3d at 561.
135. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 919.
136. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004).
137. Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 2006); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d
993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006).
138. Zhang, 434 F.3d at 999.
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139
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ applications of the automatic
Zhang.
grant of asylum to participants in traditional marriage ceremonies represent
a judicial refusal to follow the plain reading of In re C-Y-Z- and an
expansion of the rule in In re C-Y-Z- according to the judicial opinion of
Congressional intent behind the IIRIRA.

b. Direct Opposition: Eliminating In re C-Y-Z- Application
In Lin v. United States, the Second Circuit held that the plain meaning of
the language in Section 601(a) does not automatically extend asylum to
140
The Second Circuit directly
either spouses or boyfriends of victims.
opposed the holding in In re-C-Y-Z, instead holding that the BIA’s
interpretation of the IIRIRA’s automatic applicability to the spouses of
victims was incorrect.141 Lin involved the asylum applications of several
unmarried partners of victims of forced abortions, yet the Second Circuit
did not rule solely on whether the IIRIRA gave asylum to non-spousal
partners.142 Instead, the Second Circuit determined that the IIRIRA was not
sufficiently ambiguous to force circuits to give Chevron deference143 to the
BIA and held that the IIRIRA did not extend automatic asylum to the
spouse of a victim of a forced abortion or a forced sterilization.144 In order
to obtain asylum, an applicant has to show he or she had personally
“undergone or been threatened with coercive birth control procedures.”145
Despite the ambiguities of Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA that required
Chevron deference to the BIA’s holding, the Second Circuit held contrary
to the holding in In re C-Y-Z-.146 Similar holdings amongst many circuits
show confusion concerning the law and its application and support the
contention of this note for an amendment to IIRIRA Section 601(a). The
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have also followed such a direct
147
rejection of In re C-Y-Z-. In particular, the Third Circuit’s rejection of In
re C-Y-Z-’s holding in Lin-Zheng contradicts its previous position in Chen
139. Zhu, 465 F.3d at 321.
140. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir. 2007).
141. Id. at 299.
142. Id. at 299-300.
143. Id. at 300; see supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
144. Lin, 494 F.3d at 299; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
145. Lin, 494 F.3d at 314.
146. Id. at 299-300, 314.
147. See Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8 (1st. Cir. 2009); Lin-Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 557
F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2009); Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen, 568 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (11th Cir.
2009); Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 2006).
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148
v. Ashcroft. Despite the Third Circuit’s rejection of In re C-Y-Z-, it did
not overrule Chen v. Ashcroft completely because Chen v. Ashcroft did not
rule on In re C-Y-Z- directly.149 The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits’ decisions indicate a growing trend in the circuits to reject
the reasoning in In re C-Y-Z- and to reason that the IIRIRA is not
sufficiently ambiguous to give deference to the BIA’s decisions concerning
the IIRIRA. At the very least, these three circuits’ decisions represent a
significant minority opinion that refuses to grant asylum to a spouse unless
that spouse has personally undergone or been threatened with coercive birth
control procedures. This shows the need for a clarifying amendment to
Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA.

3. Summary of the Judicial Treatment of In re C-Y-ZIn summary, a large quantity of case law exists concerning In re C-Y-Z-,
and circuits are sharply divided on the ruling’s validity. Seven circuits have
150
either affirmed or deferred to the judgment in In re C-Y-Z-. This majority
reasons that asylum should extend only to the legally married husbands of
the victims of forced abortions and forced sterilizations because this
151
However, a growing
prevents fraud and keeps legal families together.
minority of circuits either hold that asylum should extend to victims’ legal
spouses and partners,152 or that Section 601(a) does not automatically
153
extend asylum to either the spouses or partners of those victims. The fact
that the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have essentially either ruled
148. Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 148-49, 153 n.7; Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir.
2004).
149. Chen, 381 F.3d at 227.
150. Id. at 227-28 (following In re C-Y-Z-); see Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182 (4th
Cir. 2007) (following In re C-Y-Z-); Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006)
(deferring to In re C-Y-Z-); Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2005) (deferring
to In re C-Y-Z-); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (deferring to In re CY-Z-); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (following In re C-YZ-); Ge v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004) (deferring to In re C-Y-Z-).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
152. Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006) (affording protection to
spouses in cases “[w]here a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place, but is not
recognized by the Chinese government because of the age restrictions in the population
control measures”); Zhu, 465 F.3d at 321 (citing approvingly to the traditional marriage
ceremony standard elicited in Zhang, even though the asylum applicant had not even been
involved in such a ceremony); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending
asylum to unmarried couples).
153. See Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d 147; Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.
2009); Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).
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dichotomously or switched sides further indicates the confusion in this area
154
of the law. The mass of conflicting case law supports the need for either
an amendment to Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA or a Supreme Court
decision that clarifies the issue. The most effective method to ensure that all
courts have clear and unambiguous legislative language to apply to
applications for asylum would be an amendment to Section 601(a).
C. Statutory Provisions Show Recognition of the Problems with Section
601(a)
In addition to the circuit split concerning the application of Section
601(a), legislative action shows the existence of recognition among
legislators that the current version of the IIRIRA contains ambiguous
provisions, and is thus insufficient. The original version of Section 601 of
the IIRIRA limited how many foreigners could gain asylum in the United
States to 1000.155 Congress has recently passed the REAL ID Act, which
removed the numerical limitation on the admittance of refugees contained
in Section 601(b) of the IIRIRA.156 Although this removal of the numerical
limitation of Section 601(b) allows more victims of persecution to find
protection in the United States, the removal of the limitation also increases
the possibility of laxity on the part of immigration officials. Unlimited
admittance removes the catalyst for meticulous consideration in the
determination of the applicants best qualified for asylum that a limitation on
admittance provides. The removal of the numerical limitation enhances the
importance of the Attorney General’s report required by Section
157
601(a)(2), further identifying the need for an amendment setting stricter
standards and requirements for the Attorney General’s report in order to
prevent fraudulent applications.
D. Additional Cases That Show the Need for an Amendment to the IIRIRA
Finally, a disagreement exists concerning the meaning of a well-founded
fear of persecution within the application of Section 601. As opposed to the
previously cited cases, where there was disagreement as to whether asylum
extended to certain members of the family, this disagreement concerns what
constitutes a well-founded fear of forced sterilization or abortion.158 In Li v.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra Part III.B.2.a.
IIRIRA § 601(b).
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §101, 119 Stat. 231, 304-05 (2005).
See IIRIRA § 601(a)(2); supra text accompanying note 45.
See supra Part III.B.
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Gonzales, the Third Circuit rejected a Chinese woman’s asylum application
claim of a well-founded fear of persecution based upon coercive family
159
The woman claimed
planning procedures performed on other people.
that her fear of a forced abortion or forced sterilization due to the coerced
experiences of her mother, sister, and aunt was well-founded.160 The court
reasoned that the woman could not stand in the shoes of her mother, aunt,
or sister, just as a fiancé could not stand in the shoes of his non-spousal
partner; therefore, the court’s reasoning affirms the rationale in In re
161
C-Y-Z-, even though it is applied to a different set of circumstances. Li v.
Gonzalez identifies both the lack of a clear definition of a well-founded fear
in Section 601(a), and the need for an amendment that specifies that only
spouses can stand in the shoes of their partner with regard to that wellfounded fear of persecution.
An amendment to Section 601 of the IIRIRA must also specify which
relatives of a victim may claim asylum. In Xue Yun Zhang v. Gonzales, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the application for asylum of a child whose mother
underwent a forced abortion, affording deference to the BIA’s denial of the
162
The court cited Chevron in its deference to an agency’s
application.
decision concerning an ambiguous statute.163 The court held that the child
of a victim of forced abortion or forced sterilization is not automatically
eligible for asylum.164 In Yuan v. United States, the Second Circuit denied
automatic asylum to the parents and in-laws of victims of forced abortions
and forced sterilizations.165 The court reasoned that the purpose of Section
601(a) was to protect the actual victims of forced abortions and forced
sterilizations, not the parents of the victims.166 The effect of these cases is
that a victim’s flight from persecution results in a fractured and separated
family. This result mandates that Section 601 must include a provision that
specifies which relatives of victims of persecutions should qualify for
asylum.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Li v. Gonzales, 151 Fed. App’x 137, 138 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 138, 140.
Id. at 140.
Xue Yun Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1246; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Xue Yun Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1250.
Yuan v. United States, 416 F.3d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 197.
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IV. SOLUTION
Since the goal behind the IIRIRA should be to provide specific standards
that require the government, courts, and officials to grant amnesty to certain
oppressed individuals without unnecessarily providing the opportunity to
foreign individuals to take advantage of the system, Section 601(a) must
effectuate such a result.167 However, as seen with the split in case law,168
this section of the Act does not accomplish the IIRIRA’s goal and thus
undercuts an effective immigration policy for the United States.169 The
cases and statutes identified supra Part III reflect the confused application
of IIRIRA Section 601(a), as well as the ambiguity of this key piece of
legislation concerning disadvantaged individuals.170 Despite the
ambiguities in IIRIRA Section 601(a), it is not past saving.171 Its attempt to
provide a solution to immigration problems has, at a minimum, established
foundational tenets on which to build. Therefore, an entirely new bill would
be an unnecessary waste of the valuable efforts that went into the drafting
172
of the IIRIRA, including Section 601(a).
The disagreements and varying interpretations of Section 601(a) among
the judicial circuits prove that judicial changes cannot be trusted to repair,
or to clarify the ambiguities. Thus, an amendment to Section 601(a) would
be the most efficient solution.173 This Note will provide a sample
amendment to Section 601(a) that would solve the problems previously
identified.
Importantly, the legislation and its subsequent application affect not only
foreign individuals, but also the integrity of United States governance.
Section 601(a) does not clearly identify whether the granting of asylum
extends to relatives of the victim.174 Because Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA
does not address the union of marriage, it does not provide requirements for
a victim’s partner to be considered a husband or spouse. A majority of
circuits have held that the spouse of a victim of a forced abortion or a
forced sterilization is automatically eligible for asylum, which is in

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

IIRIRA § 601(a).
See supra Part III.
IIRIRA § 601(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2010]

IIRIRA, SECTION 601(a)

175

175
accordance with In re C-Y-Z-. However, a growing minority of circuits
has held that the standard of In re C-Y-Z- does not apply, and that the BIA’s
interpretation of the IIRIRA’s automatic applicability to the spouses of
victims is incorrect.176 Even some circuits, purporting to follow In re C-YZ-, recognize partners that do not have a legal marriage certificate, but
rather participated in a traditional marriage ceremony without legal
documentation.177 Section 601(a) provides little guidance and few
requirements for the mandated Attorney General’s report.178 Section 601(a)
of the IIRIRA must be amended to remedy its ambiguities and
shortcomings and provide guidelines for the BIA and appellate circuits to
follow.
The necessary solution to the problems identified supra Part III is to
amend Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA to provide asylum to the immediate
family members of a victim under the laws of the victim’s home country.
These immediate family members should only include the legal husband
and the children of a victim because non-spousal partners are often not
readily, and unmistakably, identifiable under the laws of the victim’s home
country. Additionally, only marriages that are recognized by the laws of the
applicant’s home country should be valid. According to the Third Circuit in
Chen v. Ashcroft, this requirement would prevent falsification and fraud.179
Therefore, a husband applying for asylum under Section 601(a) of the
IIRIRA must produce legal documentation of marriage to a woman who has
been forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization, or has a well-founded
fear of a forced abortion or forced sterilization. An exception should be
made for members of religious, political, racial, and ethnic groups that are
prevented from legally marrying in their native country based on their
religion, race, political ideology, and ethnicity.
Moreover, Section 601(a) must be amended to require that the Attorney
General’s report contain documented evidence that each approved applicant
underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization that was coercive.
Section 601(a) should be amended to establish acceptance criteria for
asylum; if an individual underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization,
or the individual’s legal spouse underwent such treatment, and there are no
legal inconsistencies or falsifications in the documents or testimony

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See supra Part III.B.1; In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997).
See supra Part III.B.2.b.
See supra Part III.B.2.a.
IIRIRA § 601(a)(2).
See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004).
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presented, then the application may not be denied. This will prevent ad hoc
decision making on the part of the Attorney General.
Additionally, Section 601(a) must be amended to include the following
legislative definition of a well-founded fear of persecution: an applicant
must prove that a “persecutor seeks to overcome” a belief “by means of
punishment of some sort,” that “the persecutor is already aware, or could
easily become aware” that the applicant holds that belief, and that the
persecutor wants to punish holders of the belief and is capable of punishing
holders of the belief. Each court will be required by the amendment to
follow this definition of a well-founded fear of persecution in order to avoid
inconsistency.
Finally, a candidate for asylum must not be exempt from the forced
family planning policies of her native country, in any way, other than
infertility caused by past persecution. Section 601(a) should be amended to
include a provision that a woman may not obtain asylum under the IIRIRA
if she is exempt from the forced family planning policies of her native
country, in any way, other than infertility caused by past persecution. A
personal exemption from the forced family planning policies of a woman’s
native country would mean that the woman could not have a well-founded
fear of persecution.
The proposed amendment is the best solution to the problems existing in
this area of jurisprudence. If the statute is the foundation that cases are built
upon, an amendment rebuilds the inadequate foundation instead of
continually attempting to repair the faulty building above it. The IIRIRA,
particularly Section 601(a), has failed since its inception due to faulty
drafting that lacked the specifics to enable efficient and consistent
application by officials and courts.180 Courts have attempted to define,
redefine, and follow a rule that gives little direction; such a cycle leads only
to disaster, does not serve justice, and does not protect the United States.181
Therefore, any amendment must include the stated requirements in element
form; each official involved in an asylum application must follow the
elements; and any court involved must apply the elements.
Keeping in mind the actual text of Section 601(a)182 as quoted above, the
following is an Amendment that would solve the ambiguities of Section
601(a):

180. IIRIRA § 601(a); see supra Part III.
181. See supra Part III.
182. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program, shall be deemed to be a “victim” for
the purposes of this Act and to have been persecuted on account
of political opinion. Such a victim shall qualify for asylum under
the provisions of this Act and all other applicable immigration
laws of the United States of America.
Additionally, a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she
will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be
deemed to be a “victim” for the purposes of this Act, to have a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion,
and shall qualify for asylum under the provisions of this Act and
all other applicable immigration laws of the United States of
America. For the purposes of this Act, in order to prove that he
or she has suffered a well-founded fear of persecution, an
applicant must prove that:
a. a persecutor seeks to overcome a belief by means of
punishment or other force of some sort,
b. that the persecutor is already aware, or could easily
become aware that the applicant holds that belief, and
c. that the persecutor wants to punish holders of the belief
and is capable of punishing holders of the belief.
Each court shall follow this definition of a well-founded fear of
persecution. For the purposes of this Act, the refusal to undergo
an abortion or sterilization constitutes a belief that such action is
impermissible.
A female applicant may not obtain asylum under this section if
she is exempt from the forced family planning policies of her
native country, in any way, other than infertility caused by past
persecution.
Asylum shall only be provided under this section of the Act to the
immediate family members of a victim under the laws of the
victim’s home country. These immediate family members shall
only include the legal husband and the children of a victim. Only
marriages that are recognized by the laws of the applicant’s
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home country shall be valid. In order for a husband of a victim
to qualify for asylum, the husband must produce valid
documentation of marriage to a woman who has been forced to
undergo an abortion or sterilization, or has a well-founded fear
of a forced abortion or forced sterilization. However, members
of religious, political, racial, and ethnic groups that are
prevented from legally marrying in their native country based on
their religion, race, political ideology, and ethnicity shall not
have to produce such documentation, but rather must produce
sufficient evidence of an attempt to marry and an official
rejection on the basis of that husband’s membership in one of
those groups.
Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the
Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate describing the number and countries
of origin of aliens granted refugee status or asylum under
determinations pursuant to the amendment made by paragraph
(1). This report must contain documented evidence that each
approved applicant underwent a forced abortion or forced
sterilization that was coercive. If an applicant personally
underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization, or the
individual’s legal spouse underwent such treatment, and there
are no legal inconsistencies or falsifications in the documents or
testimony presented, then the application shall not be denied.
Each such report shall also contain projections regarding the
number and countries of origin of aliens that are likely to be
granted refugee status or asylum for the subsequent 2 fiscal
years.183
This amendment to Section 601(a) addresses and solves multiple
problems that the ambiguities in the existing section have caused.184 The
proposal identifies which individuals would be able to claim status as a
victim. The amendment also clarifies what constitutes a well-founded fear
of persecution. “A well founded fear of persecution” is a phrase that is
continually used in case law,185 but has not been clearly defined in Section
183. See supra text accompanying note 45 (additions to the original section are in italics).
184. IIRIRA § 601(a); see supra Part III.
185. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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601(a) in a way that includes persecution on the basis of a victim’s
beliefs.186 Additionally, the proposed amendment establishes clear
parameters for the Attorney General’s report concerning grants of
asylum.187 Most importantly, the amendment identifies which family
members of a “victim” qualify for asylum, leaving no room for
disagreement in the application of Section 601(a) in immigration law and
the appellate circuits.188
V. CONCLUSION
Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA fails to effectuate the goal of United States
immigration, which is to provide specific standards for application of
immigration law by all judicial circuits and officials within the United
States.189 An increasingly slim majority of circuits tenuously holds to the
questionably reasoned In re C-Y-Z- as a basis for the sole provision of
asylum to the legal spouse of a victim of forced abortion or forced
sterilization.190 Some circuits interpret In re C-Y-Z- as extending asylum to
both partners and legal spouses of victims, although this seems to stretch
beyond a facial application of the case’s holding.191 Still other circuits
refuse to follow In re C-Y-Z-, and subsequent statutes have tweaked some
requirements in Section 601(a), furthering the confusion.192
In light of this confusion and disagreement, Section 601(a) of the
IIRIRA must be amended to provide that only legal spouses of victims, and
the victim’s children, of forced abortion and forced sterilization can gain
automatic asylum under the statute.193 Such a provision is not a value
judgment, but rather one of practicality. Justice Alito’s reasoning in Chen v.
Ashcroft holds true today: the “objective documentary evidence” that a
legal spouse can produce prevents falsification, fraud, and unnecessary
intrusion into the lives of the applicants during and after the application
process.194 Therefore, an amendment to Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA must
provide asylum to the legal spouse of a victim and to the children of the
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra text accompanying note 45; see also IIRIRA § 601(a).
See supra proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 183.
See supra Part III.
See supra Parts III and IV.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 183.
Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004).
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victim, require that the Attorney General’s report contain documented
evidence that each approved applicant underwent a forced abortion or
forced sterilization that was coercive, include a proper legislative and not a
judicial definition of a well-founded fear of persecution, and ensure that an
applicant for asylum is not exempt from the forced family planning policies
of her native country.195

195. See supra Part IV proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 183.

